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Executive Summary 
Counterfeit electronic components have been infiltrating the electronics supply 
chain and as a result many manufacturer restrict  their purchased to authorized 
distributors or original component manufacturers  Military manufactures also 
require authorized distributors and original component manufacturer (OCMs), but 
need to support older systems that use obsolete parts or resold parts  forcing them 
to purchase parts from other sources.  Most small disadvantaged suppliers are not 
authorized distributors or OCMs and have difficulty selling material to military 
manufacturers.  In addition, military manufacturers have obligations to use 
disadvantaged suppliers, but do not want the risk associated with non authorized 
dealers.   
 
This research paper develops a method to identify risk associated with small 
disadvantaged suppliers and gives both the manufacturer and the supplier a risk 
assessment to grade suppliers.  With this information a military manufacturer can 
evaluate each supplier and quantify risk associated with that supplier and compare 
it to other suppliers.  The evaluated supplier has a list of fault modes that can be 
prioritized and used to improve its position against other suppliers.   The result is 
that each company is examined in nine categories and a numeric risk level 
associated with each category are established and documented. Both the 
manufacturer and the supplier have a quantifiable record to communicate with 
each other.   
  




Beginning in the mid 1990’s military weapons manufactures began converting 
from the traditional military-specified (mil-spec) components created after World 
War II to incorporation of commercial off the shelf electronic components 
(COTS).  Secretary of Defense William Perry issued a directive to reduce costs by 
using COTS material. His expectation was that commercial component 
manufacturers’ quality levels improved to a level that the use of highly qualified 
and costly mil-spec material was not required.  Furthermore, the life cycle of 
components and weapon systems development are getting shorter due to 
advancements in technologies that made systems obsolete only a few years after 
their introduction into the theater.   
Military use of COTS parts expanded markets for suppliers, but also 
attracted hucksters that found monetary advantage in counterfeiting 
component for systems manufactures. The necessity to support older 
systems created a market to supply hard to find components that were 
needed quickly.  These hucksters found ways to counterfeit components 
and sell them to unsuspecting manufactures, then disappear.  The effects 
of a counterfeit component in a weapons system could be catastrophic.  
Most weapons manufacturers therefore required that the suppliers deal 
directly with the original components manufacturers (OCM) and 
document this with a certificate of compliance (C of C).  This works well 
if a company requires large quantities of components.  Large companies 
that supply components tend to need large orders and do not support older 
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components and they tend not to be “minority or disadvantaged “, which 
makes it difficult for government contracted weapons manufacturers to 
meet their obligations to buy from minority owned businesses.  Low 
volume weapons manufacturers have a greater problem because they need 
smaller numbers of components and they need them quickly.  
Traditionally, small to medium minority or disadvantaged suppliers have 
filled this niche market.  But with the increasing influx of counterfeit 
components in the market, the small supplier is under greater pressure to 
assure that the parts are authentic.  This requires more resources to 
evaluate and certify the authenticity of the material purchased.  The 
medium to small business needs to balance cost of verification with the 
risk that the material is counterfeit.  This field project identifies the 
resources that are commonly used by medium and small suppliers to 
combat the issues of counterfeit components and compares them with 
military manufactures requirements.  With this information, develops a 
tool to establish risk levels for both the small disadvantaged minority 
business and the systems manufacturer, thus meeting their government 
obligations. In addition the tool provides information for the small 
disadvantaged minority businesses to evaluate their own status for the 
meeting the manufacturers validation process. 
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Chapter2 - Literature Review 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Understanding the processes dealing with counterfeit electronic components and 
how they affect government contracted manufactures and small businesses begins 
with a literature review of common definitions, processes used to quality 
components, where and how counterfeit component originate and mitigation 
technique.  A beginning must start with a common understanding of 
counterfeiting.  Articles discussing counterfeiting either imply an understanding 
of what counterfeiting is or present a definition.  The definition of counterfeiting 
and specifically a definition of counterfeit electronic components are important 
because they define the boundaries of counterfeiting.  First, a general definition of 
Counterfeiting:     
“Counterfeiting is an infringement of legal rights of an owner of 
intellectual property. Counterfeit goods mean any goods, including 
packaging, bearing without authorization a trademark which is identical to 
the trademark validly registered in respect of such goods, or which cannot 
be distinguished in its essential aspects from such a trademark, and which 
thereby infringes the rights of the owner of the trademark in question 
under the law of the country(of importation)”.  (Chatterjee 2010) 
The definition applies any product sold that has a trademark but does not describe 
the features that constitute an infringement of a trademark or intellectual property.  
Therefore it is necessary to apply a definition of a counterfeit electronic 
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component.  A counterfeit electronic component is defined as an electronic part 
that is not genuine because: 
• The component is an unauthorized copy. 
• The component does not conform to original OCM design, model,    
and/or performance standards. 
•  The component is not produced by the OCM or is produced by an       
unauthorized contractor. 
• The component is off-specification, defective, or the component is a used 
OCM product sold as "new" or working. 
• The component has incorrect or false markings and/or documentation. 
 
Processes that produce a counterfeit component can be characterized from the 
above definition.  An unauthorized copy of a component is a component that is 
produced by an aftermarket manufacturer without the approval of the original 
component manufacturer. (Crawford 2010)   
After the Second World War the military developed a series of specifications that 
protected itself from counterfeit material by controlling all aspects of the design, 
testing and acceptance of electronic parts, known as “Milspecs”.  The Milspecs 
were necessary because the design requirements for weapons and their 
components were too complex and costly for any single commercial part 
manufacturer to absorb the cost of failure. (Baron 2006) The government paid for 
the development of weapons components in order to assure a supply of high 
quality material.  The commercial component industry improved during the 
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1980’s fueled by the development of the computer industry.  Cheap high quality 
computer parts drove the cost of a computer down and the quality up.  In the early 
1990’s military budgets were being slashed due to the end of the cold war.   A 
1994 memo from Secretary of Defense, William Perry changed the government’s 
approach to purchasing commercial material in weapons.  The “Perry Memo” 
asserted that business policies needed to change because they no longer made 
sense for new technologies and instructed all armed forces to transition to 
Commercial Off the Shelf parts or COTs.  The memo directed that all the old 
Milspecs be replaced with commercial specifications where practical.  This 
redefined the procurement processes for military components.  (Baron 2006) 
 
Commercial of the Shelf components required by the military were more likely 
targets for international counterfeiting due to the globalization of the electronic 
component market and the internet, the preferred tool for purchasing components.  
Component providers work in small offices all over the world using the internet to 
conduct business. (Pecht 2006)  This made it easy to set up an internet company, 
sell counterfeit electronic components then disappear.  The next step may well be 
the counterfeiting of a whole company.  In 2004 NEC discovered a parallel 
counterfeit NEC brand set up in China with links to more than 50 electronic 
factories in mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. (Lague 2006)  
 
The military manufacturers have reacted by requiring only material from Original 
Component Manufacturers or authorized distributors of the OCMs components.   
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As the systems that the manufacturers aged the need to support them required that 
replacement parts be acquired.  Medium to Small companies called “Brokers” 
supported the military manufactures by purchasing out of date material from 
companies liquidating old inventory and overstock material and reselling it to 
them when needed to service old systems.  These companies tend to be 
disadvantaged minority owned companies. (Grow 2008)  The manufactures 
needed their services to repair their old systems and at the same time fulfill their 
obligations to use disadvantaged companies. (Livingston 2007)  This relationship 
worked well until counterfeit components became more and more difficult to 
distinguish from the authentic parts.     
 
The Commerce Department surveyed three hundred eighty seven companies and 
organizations in the industry on the issues of counterfeit components. The report 
divided the industry into five segments; original component manufacture (OCM), 
distributers and manufactures, circuit board assemblers, prime and subcontractors 
and Department of Defense (DOD) agencies.  Each segment was examined for: a) 
Levels of suspected/confirmed counterfeit parts, b) Types of devices being 
counterfeited, c) Practices employed in the procurement and management of 
electronic parts, d) Recordkeeping and reporting practices, e) Techniques used to 
detect parts, and f) Best practices employed to control the infiltration of 
counterfeits. It also provides a baseline definition of a counterfeit component.   
The condition of the OCM, distributers and manufactures are important in the 
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not kept under strict humidity control it can crack when installed and if not 
detected fail at a critical time during the products’ performance.  Many parts are 
the correct parts, but have had the solder coat on the leads recoated to 
accommodate a need for tin lead finishing.   This requires testing of the leads and 
if not caught can lead to a condition called tin whiskering.  
The following is information on counterfeit electronic component from the 
Commerce Department on the scope of the problem, the contributing behaviors, 
factors and findings. (M. H. Crawford 2010)   
 
SCOPE OF PROBLEM  
Thirty nine percent of those questioned had encountered a counterfeit component.  
Forty six percent of original component manufactures experienced a counterfeit 
discrete component and fifty four percent experienced a counterfeit microcircuit.  
Twenty two percent of authorized distributors and eighty three percent of 
unauthorized distributors experienced a counterfeit component. Thirty four 
percent of the board assemblers, twenty five percent of Prime/Sub contractors 
experienced a counterfeit component. The Department of Defense reported that 
seventeen point seven percent of DLA Organizations and thirty two percent of 
Non-DLA Organization had experienced a counterfeit component.  These 
numbers illustrate that counterfeit components have occurred in all parts of the 
supply chain.  The unauthorized distributor encountered the most, see figure I-4.                           
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The counterfeit Electronics Study (M. H. Crawford 2010) identified fifteen best 
practices. 
• Establish clear written policies and procedures 
• Increase internal/external communication 
• Institute counterfeit part training programs 
• Ensure physical destruction of defective parts 
• Inspect all returns and buy-backs to verify authenticity 
• Buy parts from OCMs and authorized distributors when possible 
• Establish lists of trusted and unapproved suppliers 
• Implement contract requirements for counterfeit avoidance policies 
and practices 
• Scrutinize suppliers with cheap prices/short lead times 
• Require traceability of part back to the OCMs 
• Verify parts meet purchase order requirements and documentation 
(inspections/testing) 
• Establish strict inventory controls 
• Remove counterfeits from regular inventory; quarantine 
• Maintain internal database to track counterfeits 
• Report counterfeits to law enforcement and industry 
associations/databases 
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Chapter 3 - Research Procedure  
 
The methodology for this research procedure involved the following: 
• Identifying key risk categories for small business manufacturers 
• Developing a survey for small businesses using these risk 
categories 
• Conducting a survey of three small businesses using the survey. 
• With the data, establishing risk level for each category for a 
FMEA.   
• Finally each company was compared and contrasted for the use of 
a manufacturer purchasing a product.   
The FMEA was translated into a list for a small business to use to perform 
a self assessment to prepare for a manufacturer audit.  
Chapter 4 - Findings 
Three small businesses were examined, one minority family owned (company A), 
one privately owned (company b) and Hub Zone Certified Small business owned 
by an investment group (company C).   Each company was examined in nine 
categories; Policies and Procedures, Training, Communications, Procurement, 
Record Keeping, Storage, Inspection, Testing and Management of Detected 
Counterfeit Parts.   Each company was chosen for its’ particular sector in small 
business.  The following is a summary of each company and the analysis for each 
FMEA. A summary of the RPNS are available in Appendix, A-2. 
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Company A is minority family owned supplier of electronic components.  Annual 
gross income is approximately $500,000 per year.  The business is housed in two 
small buildings in the Ft. Lauderdale, Florida area.   The company is ISO 
9000:2000 compliant, certified small disadvantaged minority owned business and 
CCR registered. All policies and procedures are kept in paper form using a binder 
system with updates made by the receiving inspector/quality manager.  Training is 
performed as needed by the company owner.  Communications are mainly verbal 
and paper. All procurement is performed using computers that have custom 
software written by a local friend of the family.  Sources are screened using a 
preferred vendor list kept by noting bad experience with source.  Uses credit 
checks to verify capability of source.  Primary records are paper stored in a 300 
square foot room in a building on site; some records are electronically stored on 
hard drive and backed up.  Very little product is stored on site.  The receiving, 
inspection, testing and storage area are all located in an approximately 700 square 
foot room.     Detection on counterfeit components is the responsibility of the 
operator that does receiving inspection and quality management.  There is no 
apparent area for segregation of counterfeit material. The results of company A 
are summarized in figure I-13a and the FMEA for company A follows in figure I-
13b. 
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Company B is privately owned   and located in the suburbs of Detroit.  The 
company does approximately $750,000 a year gross sales.  It is a member of 
ERAI, IDEA and is ISO 9000:2000 certified.  All policies and procedures are kept 
electronically with controlled copies updated automatically when changes are 
approved.  Training is performed by external certified contractors and all records 
are kept and tracked electronically.  All communication, procurement and record 
keeping are performed using a commercial software package that tracks all 
aspects of the business process.  Procurement verification of suppliers is 
electronic using currently available searchable database provided by GIDEP, a 
preferred supplier list and a credit check. Storage, Inspection, testing and 
counterfeit component management is performed in a 600 square foot climate 
controlled room by the receiving inspection/quality manager.  Very little product 
is stored at the facility. Segregated Counterfeit material is kept in a small locked 
cabinet in the receiving area.  The results of company B are summarized in figure 
I-14a and the FMEA for company B follows in figure I-14b. 
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Company C is a Hub Zone Certified Small business located in St. Petersburg, 
Florida, owned by an investment group grossing approximately $5 million dollars 
a year.  The company has an offshore affiliate located in the Far East.   The 
company is ISO 9000:2000 certified, member of ERAI and IDEA.  All policies 
and procedures are kept and tracked electronically.  Training is performed via 
external certified contractors and tracked in a commercially available software 
package.  Communication is tracked electronically.  Procurement sources are 
verified using GIDEP databases and verifying government reports.  All record 
keeping is electronic.  All incoming material is stored in a small 600 square foot 
room separate from inspection.  Inspection is performed by a dedicated inspector 
in a small 300 square foot climate controlled room.  X-ray and basic electrical 
testing was being developed in a separate 600 square foot climate controlled 
room.  All counterfeit material is segregated in a locked storage cage. The results 
of company C are summarized in figure I-15a and the FMEA for company C 
follows in figure I-15b. 
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All facilities provided external certified testing of parts and including destructive 
part analysis.  Only company C had x-ray capability on site with trained personal.   
The following tables (figure I-16 and figure I-17) are the potential failure codes 
and the potential modes developed for each category used in the FMEAs.  Figure 
I-16 defines the possible outcomes from a failure to detect a counterfeit 
component.  An undetected counterfeit to the customer is the worst, next is the 
part detected in the facility and the best outcome would be before it gets to the 
facility.   
Figure I-16 
 
Figure I-17 is a table of the possible failure modes associated with the best 
practices suggested by the Department of Commerce.  The failure modes are 
meant to be a starting point and as a company is audited new modes may be 
discovered.  This is the approach of an FMEA in that the small business is 
expected to fill out the corrective action side of the FMEA.  The figure I-17 also 
serves as a check list for the small business to review for the next audit. 
Potential Failures Potential Code
Undetected counterfeit part to customer. $F
Part detected before it gets out of facility, 
but company must obsorb all costs.
$$
Part detected before it gets out of facility, 
but must negotiate return of purchase 
costs.
$R





Input Category Failure Mode Mode Code
Policies and Procedures Missing or sub standard policy or procedure to detect 
counterfeit components.
M
Missing or sub standard policy for avoidance of 
counterfeit components.
A
Missing or sub standard policy for handling of 
counterfeit components.
H
Missing or sub standard management involvement MI
Missing or sub standard policy for updating 
policies of counterfeit components.
UP
Missing or sub standard policy for following 
published standards of counterfeit components.
PS
Missing or sub standard policy for tracking 
incomming and outgoing material.
TR
Missing or sub standard policy for reporting, 
managing and disposal of detected parts.
RD
Training Inadequate training to identify possible 
counterfeit parts.
IT
No hands on training. IH
Not everyone gets training. NT
Training  not kept up to date. No refresher course. RT
Communications No communication between employees about 
concerns and issues they have incountered.
NC
No communication to and from customers or 
external data bases.
NX
Procurement Inadequate verification of source IV
No traceability of parts. NTP
No trusted supplier list or insufficient list 
requirements.
NTL
No certificate of Conformance. NCOC
No escrow service. NE
Inadequate security. NS
Record Keeping system is paper only slow to respond to changes. PAS
Storage Inadequate or not organized. SI
Inspection No check of information on parts. NIC
No scope or camera to verify parts. NIH
No library to check parts against. NIL
Not trained by certified instructor. NII
Testing
No marking check with chemical rub. NMC
No Distructive Physical testing or insufficient. NDPA
No Electrical testing or insufficient testing. NET
Inadequate facilities and Inventory storage. NIF
No third party testing or insufficient quality. NTT











    
  




No internal data base to check for companies, 
individuals, countries or parts as known or 
suspected counterfeiters or counterfeit parts.  
NMDB 
  
No access to U.S. customs reports, GIDEP 
reports or industry associations and data 
bases. 
NADB 
   
The FMEA rates the company A as the most risky company with five categories 
of concern; policies and procedures, storage, inspection, testing and management 
of detected counterfeit components.  Company B is second with two areas of 
concern: Procurement and communications.  Company C would be the best of 
class with conformance to all best practices suggested by the Department of 
Commerce report.  
 
 
Chapter 5 – Summary 
After the Second World War, military component procurement depended up the 
use of mil-specs until Secretary of Defense William Perry ordered the use of 
commercial off the shelf (COTS) parts in 1994.  Mil-specs controlled the design, 
testing and acceptance for procurement of a component.  In order to facilitate 
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COTS parts Perry ordered the mil-specs be replaced with commercial 
specifications where practical.  Budgets during the mid 90s were being cut due to 
the end of the cold war and commercial parts were considered a cost effective 
way to support new systems.  At this time the growth of the personal computer 
market drove the quality levels to a level that made using COTS parts an option.  
The internet developed into the preferred tool for purchasing components.  Using 
the internet made part procurement a global business.  Small shops in China and 
all around the world were counterfeiting electronic parts.  This forced 
manufactures to restrict purchasing of components to OCMs and authorized 
distributors.  But defense contractors had systems to support that required small 
quantities of obsolete parts.  Small minority owned businesses had supported the 
military’s needs and at the same time the military manufactures met their 
contractual obligations to buy from disadvantaged businesses.  The contractors 
need a way to evaluate the risk of using a small minority business.  The minority 
businesses need a way to demonstrate that they have the appropriate safeguards in 
place.  
 
Most of the world’s counterfeit parts come from China, but not exclusively.  
Many of the counterfeit parts come from the very electronics we discard in 
America.  Parts are scavenged in small shops using cheap labor under very 
dangerous conditions.  The parts are reconditioned and are non-functional. They 
are made to look like new and sold to unsuspecting customers on the internet.  
Other parts are functional, but are remarked to look like higher quality parts and 
some shop even have the ability to use die to package into look alike parts.  As the 
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level of counterfeiting sophistication increases industry has not reacted as quickly.  
The Department of Commerce studied the state counterfeiting and published a 
report in 2010.  From this report nine categories were identified for use in an 
FMEA to evaluate risk, they were; policies and procedures, training, 
communications, procurement, record keeping, storage, inspection, testing and 
management of  detected counterfeit parts. 
 
Three small businesses, Company A, B and C were examined for compliance/risk 
to the nine categories.  Company A was a small family owned business, Company 
B was a larger privately owned business and Company C was the larger Hub Zone 
Certified Small business.  Company A was identified as the largest risk followed 
by Company B and the least risk was Company C.  A table of possible failure 
modes was developed from the FMEA for each business to address for future 
audits.      
 
Chapter 6 – Conclusions 
A business contemplating using a small privately owned business to provide 
materials should perform a risk analysis for best practices and expect to have to 
budget for costs of development of areas that require resources that the small 
business cannot afford.  Costs associated with upgrading the deficient areas must 
be weighed against the risk of noncompliance using the FMEA.  A visit to the 
small business is a must; most issues are readily apparent with a simple analysis 
and can be prioritized for the owner.  As the business grows, the more attention it 
pays to best practices and concerns of new techniques than just trying to survive.  
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The smaller business should be given less risky parts, such as discretes and made 
to prove their capability.  After an audit of the external testing resources the small 
business may be able to handle microcircuits.  With the risk analysis performed 
periodically progress can be evaluated from the baseline FMEA.  This should be 
done with all companies and shared with the purchasing agents of the purchasing 
company.  Keeping purchasing informed of the quality levels of each small 
business can minimize risk when part schedules are short and the purchasing 
agent needs to make a quick decision.   
 
Suggestions for Additional Work 
 
1.) Government agencies could establish a standardized risk 
assessment tool to document the possible modes of failures that are 
being reported by the public and publish an annual report. 
2.) Industry councils could develop a suggested tools and processes 
for a standardized risk assessment. 
3.)  Small business could develop an internal risk assessment list that 
is prioritized to work on deficient area and communicate these 
issues to employees. 
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Glossary - Principal Symbols and Nomenclature  (M. Crawford 2010) 
 
After-Market Manufacturer: A company engaged in the manufacture of electronic 
products 
initially but no longer produced by an original component manufacturer. 
 
 
Authorized Distributor: A company that is authorized by an Original Component 
Manufacturer 








Brokers: Companies/individuals engaged in the marketing of electronic parts, often 
scarce parts. 
Brokers frequently do not actually possess in inventory the parts being sought, but act as 
“middle 
men” to arrange the sale of the part from a third party. 
 
Burn-In Testing: A test which involves running a system or device for a period of time to 
ensure 
that all components are working properly. 
 
Certificate of Conformance: Document certified by a competent authority that the 
supplied 
good or service meets the required specifications. 
 
Contract Manufacturer: A manufacturer that produces made-to-order custom electronic 
parts, 
including assembled electronic boards, for a private or government customer. Parts and 
board 
products manufactured by the contract manufacturer are not brand-name products 
marketed and 
sold by the contract manufacturer. 
 
Counterfeit: An electronic part that is not genuine because it 1) is an unauthorized copy; 
2) does 
not conform to original OCM design, model, and/or performance standards; 3) is not 
produced by 
the OCM or is produced by unauthorized contractors; 4) is an off-specification, defective, 
or used 
OCM product sold as "new" or working; or 5) has incorrect or false markings and/or 
documentation. 
 
Critical Safety Parts: Parts whose failure would cause loss of life, permanent disability 
or major 
injury, loss of a system, or significant equipment damage. 
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Die: A single integrated circuit (or chip) cut from the wafer on which it was manufactured. 
 
Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA): A Department of Defense facility located 
near 
Sacramento, CA, which manufactures integrated circuit products and electronic systems 
for U.S. 
Government national security applications. 
 
Decapsulation (decapping): When the packing of a component is opened in hermetic 
conditions to allow for the examination of the die and internal features of the package. 
 
Discrete Electronic Component: Individual components such as capacitors, diodes, 
resistors, 
transistors that can be mounted on a circuit board to form a working electronic system. 
 
Electronic Testing: Evaluating the functionality of a discrete component or IC part and 
determining whether the electrical parameters of the part conform with the alternating 
current 
(AC) and direct current (DC) characteristics specified by its manufacturer. Measurements 
can be 
made at room temperature or over the recommended operating temperature range for 
the part. 
 
End-User: The person or entity that uses a product. 
 
Excess Inventory: Legitimate, genuine new electronic part product held by OCMs, 
OEMs, 
authorized distributors, contract manufacturers, and U.S. government agencies. 
 
FEDLOG: A Defense Logistics Agency system used to retrieve management, 
part/reference 
number, supplier, Commercial and Government Entity (CAGE), freight, Interchangeability 
and 




First Article Testing: A series of inspections and tests designed to ensure parts conform 
to 
drawings or part specifications. 
 
Generalized Emulation of Microcircuits (GEM): Reengineered integrated circuit 
products 
whose manufacture has been authorized to meet the need for replacement parts for 
product that 
is obsolete. These replacement products are designed and tested to emulate all the 
functions of 
microcircuits that are no longer in production. 
 
Gray Market: The trade of parts through distribution channels which, while legal, are 
unofficial, 
unauthorized, or unintended by Original Component Manufacturers. 
 
Hologram: Three-dimensional printing used to validate authenticity. 
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Incident: Occurrences, reports, or transactions pertaining to electronic parts suspected 
and/or 
confirmed to be counterfeit. For example, a report involving 10 copies of a single 
electronic part 
model equals one incident. Occurrences, reports, and transactions involving three 
separate 
electronic part models equal three separate incidents, regardless of the volume 
counterfeit parts 
for any given model. 
 
Independent Distributor: A company that markets and distributes electronic parts often 
acquired as excess inventory from OCMS, OEMs, contract manufacturers, U.S. 
Government 
organizations, and other entities. Independent distributors maintain inventories of parts 
and 
typically have controlled environments for part storage. 
 
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR): U.S. Department of State regulations 




Inventory control point (ICP): An organizational unit or activity within a Department of 
Defense 
supply system that is assigned the primary responsibility for the materiel management of 
a group 
of items either for a particular Service or for the Defense Department as a whole. Materiel 
inventory management includes cataloging direction, requirements computation, 
procurement 
direction, distribution management, disposal direction and, generally, rebuild direction. 
 
Legal Action: Filing of warning letters, civil complaints and lawsuits; filing criminal 
complaints; 
support of criminal investigations and prosecution by law enforcement agencies. 
 
Life of Type or Life Time Buy: A final purchase by a DOD organization of an electronic 
part 
prior to the cessation of production by its manufacturer. 
. 
 
Microcircuit: A miniaturized electronic device containing multiple solid-state circuits that 
works in 
conjunction to form a complete device with defined functions, and that has been 
manufactured on 
the surface of a thin substrate of semiconductor material. In these devices many active or 
passive 
elements are fabricated and connected together on a continuous substrate, as opposed 
to 
discrete devices, such as transistors, resistors, capacitors and diodes that exist 
individually. 
 
Mined Die: An integrated circuit product removed from its original OCM package and 
placed in a 
new package. 
 
Non-Conforming Parts: Parts that do not meet standard requirements or conditions. 
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Original Component Manufacturer (OCM): A company that manufacturers discrete 
electronic 
components and/or microcircuits. 
 
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM): A company that supplies equipment to other 
companies to resell or incorporate into another product using the reseller's brand name. 
 
Pedigree Paperwork: Documentation that tracks a part’s history back to its original 
manufacturer. 
 
Physical Evaluation: A process of confirming that materials used in a discrete 
component or IC 
part are genuine. It can involve destructive tests such as decapping the component’s 
package to 
validate its authenticity; evaluation of materials used in a device’s packaging materials 
(including 
connection leads and encapsulant); and examination of discrete and IC parts to verify it is 
genuine using various techniques including layer by layer destructive examination. 
 
Pre-Stock Testing: Testing of products, through any means, before they are placed in a 
company’s inventory. 
 
Prime Contractor: A lead contractor that directs and manages the delivery of large 
projects or 
products. Typically, prime contractors rely on subcontractors to provide part or all of the 
major 
components, designs, parts, or subsystems required to complete and deliver a working 
product. 
 
Product Quality Deficiency Report (PQDR): A form used by the military services and 
the 
General Service Administration to record and transmit data on defects or nonconforming 
conditions detected on new or newly reworked Government-owned products, premature 












“Seconds”: Off specification, sub-standard product made by Original Component 
Manufacturers/Original Equipment Manufacturer that is normally destroyed by 
OCM/OEMs. 
 
Subcontractor: A company that provides parts, subsystems, or systems required by a 
prime 
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contractor for completion of a product or project. 
 
Thermal/Temperature Cycling: Determines the ability of parts to resist extremely low 




U.S. Munitions List: Articles and services designated by the President of the United 
States with 
concurrence from the Department of Defense as being specifically designed or 
configured for 
military applications; there are no equivalent civilian or commercial products. 
 
Visual Inspection: Non-destructive evaluation involving visual examination for correct 
labeling, 
shape, size and dimension, form, fit, color, security coatings, etc. Visual inspection can 
include 
use of other non-destructive evaluation such as X-ray, XRF (X-ray fluorescence), and 
scanning 









Appendix  A-1 
This is the method for creating an FMEA from the Lean Six Sigma Academy. 
(Pereira 2010) 
 
10 Steps to Creating a FMEA 
June 28, 2007 By Ron Pereira 12 Comments  
A Failure Modes Effect Analysis (FMEA) is an extremely powerful tool that all 
people can and will benefit from no matter your occupation or status in life. 
Tonight, we shall discuss the history of the FMEA, the different types of FMEA, 
and finally how to actually construct one.  At the end of the post is a free FMEA 
template for your downloading pleasure.  
History 
The FMEA is not a new tool.  The aerospace industry used the FMEA during the 
Apollo missions in the 1960s.  Later in 1974 the US Navy developed MIL-STD-
1629 which discussed the proper use of the tool.  And around this time the 
automotive folks latched onto the tool and never let go.  Today, the FMEA is 
universally used by many different industries. 
Type of FMEA 
There are three main types of FMEA in use today. 
1. System FMEA: Used to analyze complete systems and/or sub-systems 
during the concept of design stage. 
2. Design FMEA: Used the analyze a product design before it is released to 
manufacturing. 
3. Process FMEA:  Used to analyze manufacturing and/or assembly process. 
The Process FMEA is probably the most commonly used and is also the least 
complex, in most cases.  
10 steps to creating a FMEA 
1. List the key process steps in the first column.  These may come from 
the highest ranked items of your C&E matrix.  
2. List the potential failure mode for each process step.  In other words, 
figure out how this process step or input could go wrong. 
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3. List the effects of this failure mode. If the failure mode occurs what does 
this mean to us and our customer… in short what is the effect? 
4. Rate how severe this effect is with 1 being not severe at all and 10 being 
extremely severe.  Ensure the team understands and agrees to the scale 
before you start.  Also, make this ranking system “your own” and don’t 
bother trying to copy it out of a book. 
5. Identify the causes of the failure mode/effect and rank it as you did the 
effects in the occurence column.  This time, as the name implies, we are 
scoring how likely this cause will occur.  So, 1 means it is highly unlikely 
to ever occur and 10 means we expect it to happen all the time. 
6. Identify the controls in place to detect the issue and rank its 
effectiveness in the detection column.  Here a score of 1 would mean we 
have excellent controls and 10 would mean we have no controls or 
extremely weak controls.  If a SOP is noted here (a weak control in my 
opinion) you should note the SOP number. 
7. Multiply the severity, occurrence, and detection numbers and store this 
value in the RPN (risk priority number) column.  This is the key number 
that will be used to identify where the team should focus first.  If, for 
example, we had a severity of 10 (very severe), occurrence of 10 (happens 
all the time), and detection of 10 (cannot detect it) our RPN is 1000.  This 
means all hands on deck… we have a serious issue! 
8. Sort by RPN number and identify most critical issues.  The team must 
decide where to focus first. 
9. Assign specific actions with responsible persons.  Also, be sure to 
include the date for when this action is expected to be complete. 
10. Once actions have been completed, re-score the occurrence and 
detection.  In most cases we will not change the severity score unless the 
customer decides this is not an important issue. 
Dynamic Document 
The single biggest failure people make with FMEAs is to spend time completing 
the document and then storing it in a file cabinet somewhere.  The FMEA is the 
ultimate dynamic document meaning it lives as long as the process or product it is 
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Appendix A-2 





















Management of detected 
counterfeit components
